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Moral Bearings: 
Thinking about the Basis of an Ethical Life 
PAUL CRI1TENDEN* 
Philosophy and the quest for foundations 
When I first took up the study of philosophy forty seven years 
ago, the course text was a Latin work entitled Cursus 
Philosophiae, written by a French Jesuit, Charles Boyer.! (The 
author is to be distinguished, of course, from the then 
contemporary French film star of the same name.) That was in 
an ecclesiastical faculty at a time when neo-scholasticism still 
reigned supreme. In my second year we were taught by a lecturer 
who had recently returned from Europe with an interest in 
phenomenology and a conviction that we needed to know 
something about modem European philosophy in general. So 
we heard about Descartes and Spinoza, Kant and Hegel, 
Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Sartre, to some extent in 
their own right, not simply as adversaries and proponents of 
errors already identified and refuted long in advance by Thomas 
Aquinas. But neo-scholasticism, as distilled by Charles Boyer, 
certainly provided the main philosophical diet, with arguments 
set out in the form of theorems or proofs in which erroneous 
views were castigated and sure and certain conclusions were 
propounded, notably in metaphysics, epistemology and ethics. 
Boyer's text offered the following definition of philosophy, 
no doubt with a view to ensuring that the reader would get 
things straight from the beginning: 
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[Philosophy is] the science of all things considered through their 
ultimate principles by the natural light of reason.2 
Neo-scholasticism, it should be said, was far from alone in its 
portrayal of philosophy as an all-embracing inquiry into ultimate 
foundations. Indeed, one could say that an understanding of this 
kind has suffused philosophy from its beginning, when there 
emerged among the Ionian thinkers of the sixth century (Greek 
era) a form of inquiry into the basic principles of the cosmos, 
which was distinct, but not entirely distinct, from the 
mythological accounts of the poets. From an early stage, notably 
with Parmenides, philosophy assumed an Olympian perspective 
or god's-eye point of view as the way of truth, a voice which 
speaks as if from outside time and space. No one gave this 
approach more authoritative voice or more moving expression 
than Plato who, two generations after Parmenides, identified 
philosophers as 'lovers of the vision of truth' who 'see the 
absolute, the eternal and immutable', who are not concerned 
with running around to the Dionysiac festivals or gaping at the 
sights and sounds of the Olympic games, but who stand, in 
effect, on Olympus itself and contemplate all time and all eternity 
(Republic, 475e; 47ge; 500c). 
When the Platonist (or Greek) vision appeared to collapse in 
the post-medieval world, Descartes provided a partial rescue, 
with the promise of a new understanding of the foundations of 
knowledge. This was grounded in the experience of the individual 
thinking subject but in a way that yielded, through the method of 
radical doubt and ingenious argument, yet again a divinely 
guaranteed Olympian perspective, at least so far as clear ideas, 
especially in mathematics and the natural sciences, were 
concerned. By contrast, the status of ethics as a form of knowledge 
became particularly problematic from this point, since ethics 
appeared to be fixed entirely on the subjective side of the divide. 
That is how many people have seen the matter since that time. 
Even so, the quest for foundations for knowledge, including 
attempts to find a rational ground for ethics, as in the Kantian 
conception of the moral law, has continued as a dominant theme 
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in modem philosophy. By now, however, there is a widespread 
conviction that what Nietzsche announced late in the nineteenth 
century in terms of the death of God has finally come to pass; that 
neither religion nor philosophy, reason nor science, can serve as 
the ultimate ground of truth, and that the quest itself is radically 
misguided. On the other hand, there is considerable disagreement 
about where the loss of faith in foundations leaves us. 
One common response is to conclude, as in some fonns of 
post-modernism, that there are no grounds for comparing and 
assessing points of view at all, that nothing is true or good in 
any general sense, nothing is finn. As expressed in one of 
Nietzsche's favourite metaphors, this is the view that we have 
left the land behind us and have embarked on an open sea without 
fixed bearings. In such a world, he suggests, in place of a single 
over-arching perspective, we are faced with what may be an 
infinity of interpretations and points of view without number.3 
But is it true, in ethics or in other fields, that if we give up the 
idea of an absolute foundation we are forced into free fall, that if 
we cannot take an Olympian perspective we must find ourselves 
entirely at sea? 
It is worth reflecting for a moment on some of the 
ramifications of Nietzsche's image of the boat on the open sea. 
Its context is the belief that the foundations of European 
culture, as provided hitherto by Christianity and Greek-inspired 
philosophy, have collapsed and must be replaced-how we 
cannot yet be sure-by some stronger, healthier, more satisfactory 
sense of ourselves and the world we inhabit. Those who grasp 
the truth of the situation now enter on a new enterprise: 'we 
have left the land and have embarked. We have burned our 
bridges behind us- indeed, we have gone farther and destroyed 
the land behind us'.4 In thinking about the image of the open 
sea, we must assume that these fearless adventurers will take 
their bearings from the sun and stars and will have to find ways 
of acting together to resolve the common problems they face, 
knowing that they cannot go back to the world they have left. 
What qualities or virtues do these Nietzschean sailors need if 
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they are to survive and have some chance of success in their 
quest for a new world? Nietzsche does not offer a reply at this 
point: the passage about the open sea is followed immediately 
by the famous section in The Gay Science concerning the death 
of God. But elsewhere in this text, and in related writings, 
Nietzsche does furnish the makings of an answer. For all his 
reputation as a moral iconoclast, he emphasises again and again 
the compelling need for truthfulness, honesty, courage, nobility, 
generosity, and unwavering hope, if we are to deal with the 
cultural crisis which surrounds us. Even when allowances are 
made for a distinctive Nietzschean stamp, these are virtues which 
already held a central place in Greek and Christian cultures. In 
other words, there would appear to be significant common ground 
between the moral map of the old world and what is needed to 
give shape to the new world which Nietzsche portrays as waiting 
to be born. 
A general argument for common ground in ethics 
The idea that there is, or might be, common ethical ground 
across different times and cultures is widely criticised in 
contemporary ethical writing.5 Why is this? One reason is that it 
is seen as a relic of uncritical foundationalism in ethics. It carries 
with it the baggage of claims to universal, unchanging truths, an 
essential human nature, or related ideas of an absolute standpoint, 
the eternal moral law , the ineffable form of the Good. Moreover, 
in the history of western culture these ideas took on a range of 
religious forms, sometimes liberating but commonly oppressive, 
associated with the Christian idea of God as ultimate source of 
unity, truth and goodness and as absolute moral judge of human 
life. Secondly, talk of common ground in ethics could be seen as 
a failure to take account of differences between people in both 
historical and cultural terms. In this view, a general prejudice in 
favour of sameness and continuity has now been challenged by 
a more informed historical sense, which is alert to differences 
and discontinuities over time;6 even more importantly, there is 
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the view that common ground has been put in question by the 
evidence of ethical diversity across different cultures, attested 
by modern anthropological inquiry. Thirdly, talk of common 
ground might be seen as morally objectionable, in the sense that 
typically it involves the privileging of the values of one's own 
culture (or sub-culture); one is then led to see and judge the 
world in terms of those values. This is given sharper point by 
the fact that awareness of other cultures in European experience 
was commonly associated with aggression, as in the crusades in 
the middle ages, pogroms against Jews over the centuries, and 
colonial expansion and conquest in the modern era. 
These arguments, singly or together, might lead to the 
conclusion that ethical views are time-bound and perspectival in 
a local sense, typically that they have no reach beyond the 
particular cultural background in which they arise. I intend to 
argue against this conclusion, but not in the name of seeking a 
transcendent ground for ethics, whether of a religious or a 
philosophical kind. I will say a word about this approach first. 
For the definitive argument against the idea that moral claims 
might be grounded in divine authority, one should go back to 
Plato's Euthyphro. In brief, Plato shows that reference to God's 
will, which many religious-minded people find reassuring, either 
renders the moral life arbitrary (as no more than obedience to a 
form of power); or else it is completely unilluminating, supposing 
that the believer wants to hold that God wills the good because it 
is good. For, in that case, one must know what the good is 
independently of God's will. What Plato offered in place of the 
attempt to ground morality in this way might be seen nonetheless 
as a philosophical version of the religious model. In place of the 
knowledge of God's will, he put knowledge of the Good, the Idea 
or Form of the Good, which exists in an eternal order beyond the 
familiar human world. The suggestion in the Phaedrus (250a-b) 
is that in experience we catch a glimpse of the pure being of 
justice, temperance, beauty and all the great moral qualities which 
we hold in honour, as if sustained by a faint memory of what we 
once saw when dwelling with the gods in a previous existence. 
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This fleeting vision of the good, supported by Plato's genius 
for argument, myth and poetry, is immensely powerful and 
must speak in some sense to a dimension of human experience.? 
It connects especially with the sense that some manifestations 
of good and evil---especially evil-defy human understanding. 
Yet the appeal to a transcendent, otherwise unknowable, good 
cannot throw light on any specific moral claim. This applies 
also, I think, to more recent attempts to ground morality in a 
transcendent source, such as Levinas's idea of the infinitely 
Other. The critical consideration is that our idea of good, as 
our idea of evil, is necessarily the fruit of human experience, 
gathered within human communities, in the places in which we 
live our lives. The postulate of a transcendent order may give 
depth to our convictions; but if we can say what it is that 
makes for moral goodness, we have to find it within the world 
of human understanding, imagination and experience (which 
may reach out, of course, beyond the merely human world). 
I want to go back now to the claim that ethical views abound 
in different cultures to the exclusion of common ground. 
The standard argument appeals to claims about cross-cultural 
ethical diversity. We are familiar with ethical differences within 
our own society: people hold conflicting views on a range of 
important issues, for example, on critical matters relating to 
birth and death, sexuality, race relations, or what justice requires 
in the distribution and use of material resources. These differences 
are genuinely problematic, and in some cases might threaten to 
tear a society apart. At the same time, they exist in conjunction 
with wide agreement on ethical matters, including consensus on 
a significant list of binding moral demands and prohibitions. 
Also, in principle at least, the topics in dispute are subject to 
reasonable debate even if the prospect of general agreement is 
unlikely. In the case of ethical diversity across cultures, however, 
the argument is of a different order: here, in the view of a number 
of contemporary philosophers, cross-cultural ethical differences 
exclude common ground and rule out any basis for discussion 
or resolution. Proponents of this view do not deny that the people 
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concerned share a nature with us, but they hold that the idea of a 
common humanity does not encompass ethical matters. Ethical 
beliefs, they conclude, are to be understood as essentially local 
and time-bound in character, true or false (if true or false at all) 
in a relative sense. 
Clearly, the force of this argument rests on the factual claim 
that appropriate anthropological or historical investigation has 
indeed shown that there are cultures with little or no common 
ethical ground. This is the contention of descriptive cultural 
relativism. Many anthropologists espouse this view and many 
philosophers, John Mackie or Bernard Williams for example, 
refer to it as to an established fact. 8 Is it a fact? Undoubtedly, 
ethnographic and historical studies provide evidence of great 
cultural diversity between people; but the critical issue is whether 
the embedded ethical differences are of the radical kind that 
cultural relativism supposes-that is, differences such as to 
exclude common ground or to defy possible mediation. In fact, 
the evidence for ethical difference of the required kind appears 
greatly exaggerated (as Michele Moody-Adams has argued 
persuasively in a recent book).9 The standard examples, in the 
writings of anthropologists and philosophers who draw on them, 
relate to specific practices in the major areas of human 
relationships, the treatment of the young and the very old, rules 
of kinship and sexual practices, and relations with others beyond 
the identified group. The recurring examples concern such 
practices as ritual headhunting, the exposure of infants or the 
very old to death, polygamy, strange initiation practices, 
callousness in regard to animal suffering. 
These different practices are, of course, elements in the larger 
set of beliefs, traditions and values which constitute the world 
of the different culture. The task of describing precisely what 
the people believe, how their institutional arrangements work, 
what they are doing in particular situations, how they understand 
what they are doing, is long and demanding. Among other things 
it requires familiarity with the language, or languages, of the 
people concerned. Even then, in giving accounts of unfamiliar 
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practices, ethnographers have to cope with a standard problem 
of under-determination, of not knowing enough or as much as 
they would like about the people in question. But let us agree 
that these difficulties have been overcome to a satisfactory level 
in a large number of impressive studies. Two considerations are 
now relevant. First, the standard examples of ethical difference 
concerned with the treatment of the young and the old, family 
organisation, and so on, do not manifest radical difference to the 
exclusion of more general common ground, for example, the 
existence in every society of provisions for caring for the young 
and for sharing goods and compensating harms. Taking account 
of differences in beliefs and circumstances, and allowing that 
the same basic value (courage, for example) can be expressed 
differently in different social forms, the evidence for radical 
difference of the specified kind is curiously elusive. 
The second query concerns the assumption that cross-
cultural studies describe ethical practices on the basis of empirical 
data established in evaluatively neutral terms. The point is that 
we are able to ascribe values to others only because we hold 
some related values ourselves. We are able to recognise that the 
others are engaged in evaluation only by being engaged in the 
practice ourselves. How could observers pick out the moral 
phenomena of a different way of life, or even decide that a 
people have moral beliefs, except on the basis of making 
connections which grow out of their own grasp of moral ideas? 
That is, the establishment of common ethical ground is the first 
and necessary step in identifying and making sense of ethical 
differences. lO This process, at least in its original setting, is a 
practical enterprise. One who would give an adequate account 
of the ethical beliefs of the people of another culture must live 
with them for a time, build up relationships with them and share 
their life to some degree. This would not be possible without the 
establishment of a degree of trust expressed in a range of value-
laden practices which have to do with meeting ordinary human 
needs for food and shelter and with promoting informative, truth-
telling communication on each side. In a word, we find that the 
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parties concerned, like Nietzsche's sailors on the open sea, have 
need for the common moral qualities of truthfulness, trust, 
honesty, courage, hope and generosity. 
Clearly, these remarks do not settle the matter, but they 
provide good reason for thinking that the prevailing opposition 
to talk of common ethical ground is not well founded. My general 
hypothesis is that local forms of ethics might be seen in important 
respects as distinctive ways of dealing with common conditions, 
possibilities, and problems related to the kind of beings we are 
and the world we inhabit. These factors provide a broad 
framework for morality and shape the character of the many 
forms it has taken in different times and places. 
It is important to recognise the limited character of the ethical 
generality which is involved in this approach. Specifically, it is 
not part of a project for a universal ethics or a single true morality 
which could be detached from specific forms of human life and 
then re-applied universally as a generic formula. The relevant 
generality, built around the idea of common factors and the 
rather bare notion of a range of broadly identifiable virtues and 
vices, could not serve this universalist role. The recognition of 
common ground in different ethical forms could not take the 
place of the substantive ethics of particular times and places. 
What it offers, rather, is support for the view that, while our 
thinking about ethical issues is always at a time and place, we 
are able to go beyond the constraints of the merely local 
perspective. In this way, the recognition of common ground 
could be linked with the idea of agreement in ethical judgments, 
albeit at a very general level, and provide the basis for a related 
notion of ethical objectivity. In this context, the recognition of 
common ground helps to provide reasonable confidence that 
we, and others, have some ethical knowledge which is as firm as 
any knowledge human beings can have (allowing that there is 
dispute on many matters and much that we do not know). To 
explore these ideas further, I propose to consider some of the 
ways in which our moral understanding and experience is shaped 
by conditions of dependence on others, beginning in childhood 
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and continuing in different ways throughout our lives. 
Before that, however, I want to round off the present 
discussion by commenting briefly on the claim that we 'find' 
common ground with others because we construct it in the very 
process of interpreting their views from the standpoint of our 
own perspective; and that this is expressed typically in a form of 
ethical imperialism. In reply, it is clear that our own moral 
understanding does indeed provide the basis for understanding 
others. This emphasises the importance of being sensitive to the 
scope for misunderstanding and mistakes and the need for caution 
in drawing conclusions (whether of sameness or difference). 
But it does not follow that we are caught in a viciously expanding 
circle in which the interpreter constantly reconstructs the other 
in his or her own likeness. This is put in question precisely by 
the widespread recognition that different people do hold different 
ethical views. The recognition of difference in itself, however, 
is a two-edged sword. In the history of unhappy confrontations 
between cultures, the conviction about difference commonly 
assumes that these others are not fully human in some privileged 
sense and can be swept aside. Against this, a willingness to 
recognise common ethical ground across difference could make 
all the difference. 
The moral ground can be divided in different ways in these 
situations. Take a familiar example. Representatives of colonial 
powers, convinced of the superiority of their way of life and its 
associated values, frequently did untold harm to the way of life 
of indigenous peoples. On the other hand, it was precisely in the 
name of a common humanity and the conviction that values 
such as fairness, truthfulness and respect have general import 
that others spoke out against the wrongs done to indigenous 
peoples in driving them from their land and undermining their 
way of life. Australian society in the nineteenth century, and to 
the present time, provides a good example of divided moral 
ground in this domain; and the issues are yet to be resolved. 
What is at stake once again is the recognition that the same 
value, broadly conceived, may be expressed differently in 
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different cultures. In commenting on the interpretative study of 
cultures, the anthropologist Clifford Geertz proposed two guiding 
principles: (a) 'to see others as sharing a nature with ourselves' 
as a matter of 'the merest decency'; and (b) '[to see] ourselves 
amongst others, as a local example of the forms human life has 
taken locally, a case among cases, a world among worlds' .11 
The task of recognising ourselves as 'a local example of the 
forms human life has taken locally' relates to overcoming the 
temptation to generalise our own standpoint. But this undertaking 
does not, in fact, suppose that we could, or should, retreat to the 
closed world of a purely local perspective. On the contrary, the 
achievement of realising our ethical or cultural particularity 
would not be possible without a general, albeit revisable, 
conception of human life and ethical values. In any case, 
notwithstanding the force of the myth of Babel, no culture is an 
island 'whole and entire to itself, but is shaped through relations 
to other times, other places, other ways of life. In short, a local 
ethics typically involves a window on the world. 
Human well-being, dependence on others, and the virtues 
In the remaining part of this paper, I want to consider some of 
the ways in which the general human condition of dependence 
on others shapes the character of morality, allowing that relevant 
practices differ in different cultures. The salient forms of 
dependence arise in childhood and old age and in periods of 
illness; but a moment's thought makes clear that forms of 
dependence, and inter-dependence, run across human activity 
and social life at every stage of our existence-engagement in 
teaching and learning in a school or university provides a primary 
example. The theme of dependence and its connection with the 
virtues has been explored recently in a recent study by Alasdair 
MacIntyre: I am indebted to this study, though in taking up the 
topic I am returning to themes which I first discussed about a 
decade ago in a book on moral development. 12 
I am treating moral philosophy here as continuous with 
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ordinary moral inquiry about what is important and worthwhile 
in human life. This is moral inquiry in the Socratic sense of 
asking how one should live, taking its stand broadly with the 
Aristotelian view that questions about ethics are continuous with 
questions about what is involved in living a human life, in which 
notions of good and bad are based on the consideration that we 
are an animal species of a particular kind marked by a range of 
broadly identifiable characteristics, capacities and powers. In 
the setting of a particular time and place, the focal question then 
concerns the well-being of beings of this kind, the terms in 
which they can be said to live well. There is considerable 
disagreement about this, as my subsequent critique of some of 
Nietzsche's views will make clear. Nevertheless, the topic 
includes matters about which we know some important things if 
we know anything at all. 
An approach which stresses the consideration that we are an 
animal species of a particular kind might be thought to give too 
much weight to biological considerations. But the approach is 
shorthand for much else, for the terms in which things can go 
well or badly run across the whole range of human capacities 
and powers at each stage of life, and relate to the forms of social 
and political organisation and practice we develop and the 
environment in which we live. Ideally, the project calls for a 
philosophical anthropology as well as attention to the 
particularities of time and place. But it is important to recognise 
that people everywhere can have a genuine understanding of 
what it is to be human and to live an ethical life without having 
to provide a theory of human nature. Take an example. We 
express our humanness, in Primo Levi's words: 
through the ability to love or remember or share or feel gratitude, 
to be something more than a bundle of 'suffering and needs', 
more than someone else's instrument; through the ability to value 
time or recognise other worlds, to do good or imagine the 
possibility of doing it, to act, even hopelessly, against oppression. 13 
One could object that this begs the question of common ground 
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since moral considerations enter into the account of what it is to 
be human. Levi's remarks, we know, relate to a particular aspect 
of his own experience, prompted by reflections on the profound 
evil which human beings effected in the Holocaust. But the 
remarks serve to make the general point that the attempt to 
understand what it is to be human inevitably and properly brings 
in moral considerations; it also reflects the fact that moral inquiry 
necessarily arises in medias res. One has to make a beginning 
somewhere; what matters then is how the inquiry proceeds, 
especially in meeting appropriate standards of argument and 
evaluation. In the present instance, my inquiry concerns our 
dependence on others, especially in childhood. I think that this 
is a good place to begin; but I have to point out that the discussion 
will not take the issues very far. 
Consider a child and those who have primary care for it, 
usually the child's parents, or at least one of its parents. What 
very young children need if they are to do well is an immense 
amount of attention on the part of their carers relating to their 
need for food, warmth, sleep, security, protection from harm, 
and not least the need for on-going human company, all as an 
expression of sustained love of a broadly unconditional kind. 
The care that is directed to the child, supposing the child is 
fortunate, is concerned in the first place with meeting his or her 
immediate needs. But this care also has medium and long-term 
directions, preparing the child for the next stage of development 
where, for example, she learns to walk and talk and to develop a 
sense of self, and on through the long process of learning and 
growth in childhood and adolescence to some broadly envisaged 
stage of maturity. 
The needs that are met by parental care identify a domain of 
what is good for the child, though of course the child has no 
awareness of that until much later. On the other hand, the task of 
meeting the needs calls for a broadly identifiable range of moral 
qualities on the part of carers: good practical judgment based on 
a working knowledge of what children need, loving commitment, 
responsibility, self-control, patience, courage, fairness, good 
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humour even when the going is hard, and a willingness to let go, 
to let children become their own persons, to move into worlds 
beyond this particular relationship, and eventually to assume 
responsibility for their lives. What emerges is a case for seeing 
the carer-child relationship as a paradigm for moral relationships 
and moral authority. For the carer has to take responsibility for 
the well-being of the child; and this includes responsibility for 
helping the child to acquire the qualities which make it possible 
to become a person who cares about his or her own well-being 
and the well-being of others. 
As everyone knows, the task is immensely difficult. Quite 
apart from the many cases of neglect, exploitation or abuse, the 
early learning of the child, as MacIntyre comments, is 
characteristically imperfect learning at the hands of imperfect 
teachers who were once imperfect learners themselves. 14 In 
advance of the insights of Freudian psychoanalysis, Nietzsche 
pushed this consideration to a further level: 
Parents involuntarily make of their child something similar to 
themselves-they call it 'education'-and at the bottom of her 
heart no mother doubts that she has borne a piece of property, no 
father disputes his right to subject it to his concepts and values. 15 
What Nietzsche marks out is a genuine problem in education, 
not the whole truth; the critical point is that the task can be done 
well or badly and is subject to evaluation (as Nietzsche's own 
comment makes clear). Along with this combative reflection, 
one could juxtapose Hegel's observation in The Philosophy of 
Right that 'children are potentially free ... Consequently they are 
not things and cannot be the property either of their parents or 
others' .16 Hegel's subsequent account of the basis of an ethical 
life is that early ethical education consists best in conveying 
principles 'in the form of immediate feeling for which differences 
are not yet explicit, so that thus equipped with the basis of an 
ethical life, the child's heart may live its early years in love, 
trust, and obedience'. In short, ethical education in the beginning 
is grounded in the affections, especially in love and trust. Later 
education can then take this further to the level of habit acquired 
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through encouragement and constraint, to the point at which 
children have their own lives and freedom of personality, their 
independence and responsibility. Clearly, an account on these 
lines has the character of an ideal, if one thinks of the moral 
evil, ignorance and failure which commonly blights human 
development. But that is not an objection, since it is only in 
terms of standards of well-being that relative success or failure 
can be assessed. 
What do we need to have acquired on the long road to 
independent responsibility? The short answer is that we need to 
have acquired the knowledge and dispositions which our carers 
and teachers originally needed in helping to get us to that point, 
viz., good practical judgment concerning human well-being, 
our own and others, the ability to distinguish between a good 
reason for action and forms of self-indulgence (for example), 
self-knowledge, some knowledge of others and the world, of 
connections between actions and their outcomes, a power of 
imagination to be able to envisage different possibilities, critical 
detachment combined with willingness to take advice from 
others, self-control, a concern for justice, truthfulness, courage 
in facing difficulties, generosity, a capacity for love and 
friendship, a willingness to accept difference, and the like. 
There is no implication here, of course, that the social 
relationships involved in the care and education of children 
subsume the whole domain of human well-being and morality. 
Their significance is that they constitute, for better or worse, the 
primary matrix of development and provide the original ground 
for the qualities which bear centrally on human well-being; but 
circles of wider relationships are present from the beginning 
and build out to the complex set of communities of the larger 
society and world in which one comes to live. Childhood is the 
primary age of dependence, but mutual dependence continues in 
any complex enterprise, and dependence returns, albeit in 
different ways, in illness and old age. 
The question for consideration is this. What difference does 
recognition of original and continuing dependence make to a 
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more general understanding of human well-being and moral 
values? The answer is that, in addition to the qualities which 
allow us to assume independence, we need also to have acquired 
what MacIntyre calls virtues of acknowledged dependence. The 
social relationships through which we become responsible moral 
beings are essentially networks of giving and receiving in which 
'the good of each cannot be pursued without also pursuing the 
good of all those who participate in those relationships' .17 This 
emphasis draws attention to the neglected idea of the common 
good-that is, goods to which one has access as member of a 
community, goods that one person has, not in opposition to the 
other, but insofar as the other has them as well. To participate in 
social relationships of this form is to recognise what we owe to 
particular others, to return support to them as appropriate, and 
to extend it in our tum to others. With reference to giving, the 
primary virtues of acknowledged dependence are a commitment 
to justice enlarged by generosity and, more generally, the 
disposition to help those who are in need; with reference to 
receiving, it is a matter of appropriate gratitude and courtesy. 
In addition, it is clear that the virtues which mark independence 
also involve a framework of dependence, as one can see if one 
thinks about justice, truthfulness, courage, and the capacity for 
love and friendship. These familiar considerations have radical 
bearing on how we conceive the common moral ideal of 
independence, self-sufficiency and responsibility. They have 
similar importance for our thinking about social, economic and 
political relationships if these are to be structured around an 
effective concern for common good in conjunction with 
individual good. 
By way of conclusion, I want to draw out these points by 
returning to Nietzsche's image of the open sea to ask again how 
his sailors might fare given his well-known commitment to an 
ethical and political standpoint in which dependence on others 
is treated as deeply problematic. The open sea lies 'in the horizon 
of the infinite'; it is a world which 'may include infinite 
interpretations'. In this vein Nietzsche observes (in Thus Spoke 
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Zarathustra) that there are many different peoples, many different 
types of human beings, hence many different forms of life and 
morality. A second significant theme in his ethical thinking 
(elaborated in the same source) involves an emphasis on creating 
one's own table of what is good, giving oneself laws, creating 
oneself: 'Can you furnish yourself with your own good and evil 
and hang up your own will above yourself as a law? Can you be 
judge of yourself and avenger of your law?' 18 
Some readers take these ideas as a Nietzschean endorsement 
of an ethical free-for-all. This is completely at odds in fact with 
Nietzsche's considered view, though he certainly rejected the 
project for a universal morality. It is important to recognise that, 
for Nietzsche, the task of creating values rests with rare types of 
human being, with sovereign individuals who forge a new way 
of thinking and who enrich people's experience and make it 
possible for others to see differently and to live differently. Such 
types are marked by an authority which comes from self-mastery, 
bold courage in taking risks and facing dangers, utter truthfulness, 
reverence for the self, and freedom from resentment or ill-will. 
They are marked in particular by 'lofty spiritual independence, 
the will to stand alone'; and he comments 'few are made for 
independence-it is a privilege of the strong' . As for the ordinary 
run of people: 
... ever since there have been human beings there have also been 
human herds (family groups, communities, tribes, nations, states, 
churches), and always very many who obey compared with the 
very small number of those who command.19 
At the heart of Nietzsche's ethics is 'an ideal of human, 
superhuman well-being' which he calls 'the great health': 'a 
new health, stronger, more seasoned, tougher, more audacious, 
and more cheerful than any previous health' which can be attained 
by the few-this, in contrast with what he saw as the weak, sick, 
mediocre, miserable health of contemporary herd culture.20 At 
the heart of his politics is the related conviction that human 
societies can be justified only through the rare individuals who 
transform a culture and give it new health and meaning. The 
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urgency of these ideas in Nietzsche's thought lies in the belief 
that European culture, once sustained by Christianity and 
Platonism, has lost its way and is wracked by a debilitating loss 
of belief. The critical issue is whether the coming age will give 
rise to the exceptional beings of great health who will create 
new meaning and values beyond the shipwreck of the current 
loss of meaning. Who then are the sailors on Nietzsche's boat 
and what undiscovered country will they seek? 
His diagnosis of the illness of his time-and ours-is marked 
by considerable power and insight. At the same time, as we 
have seen, the moral map which he draws for his argonauts of 
the open sea overlaps considerably with the moral map of its 
predecessors in the Jewish, Greek and Christian worlds. 
Nietzsche, of course, is concerned with future possibility, and 
clearly no map of the future could possibly be complete. But his 
moral map is marked by a critical absence: it has little or no 
place for the conditions and forms of human association. In his 
emphasis on lofty spiritual independence and the 'pathos of 
distance', questions about social relationships are placed largely 
in the category of herd culture. In this framework, relationships 
of dependence fall under particular disdain. 
This standpoint emerges notoriously in Nietzsche's 
characterisation of pity, identified as the central virtue of herd 
morality, as a sick and debilitating quality. About this one could 
say that what he objects to are forms of self-deceiving pity which 
distort genuine benevolence; or that he is espousing a Stoic 
view in which pity for those in need is seen as misplaced on the 
grounds that the morally good person is self-sufficient and is 
not genuinely harmed by sickness or misfortune. There is point 
in these comments to the extent that the Nietzschean noble 
individual may, from a distance, exercise benevolence out of a 
spirit of abundance. But actual concern for the weak or helpless, 
whatever the circumstances, is incompatible with his conception 
of strength and well-being, whether in the strong individual or 
in society as a whole. In this vein, his fundamental objection to 
pity relates to what pity effects: he rejects it because '[Pity] 
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preserves what is ripe for destruction; it defends life's disinherited 
and condemned; through the abundance of the ill-constituted of 
all kinds which it retains in life it gives itself a gloomy and 
questionable aspect' .21 
To refer for a last time to Nietzsche's sailors. We can suppose 
that they are all sovereign individuals, marked by spiritual 
independence and the related virtues to which he draws attention. 
Being equal in strength, they may also be friends; but since 
there is no place for acknowledged dependence, friendship cannot 
be linked with shared needs; it arises rather as a form of rivalry 
among the strong: 'In your friend you should possess your best 
enemy . Your heart should feel closest to him when you oppose 
him' .22 One can suppose that in this agonistic spirit the sailors 
co-operate competitively so far as is necessary to deal with the 
elements and avoid shipwreck. What they cannot do is to 
acknowledge that they are engaged in a common task around a 
common good in which they have need of one another. The 
pathos of distance thus rests on a form of self-deception. In 
political terms, the adventurous sailors constitute a loose-knit 
aristocracy of individuals. Where then is everyone else, the 
common herd? One has to suppose that they remain in the land 
of the past; the best hope is that word of the new world will 
come to them eventually across the distance; and while their 
values will remain broadly herd values, the hope is that they 
might be free from resentment towards higher types, the 
sovereign individuals who embody 'great health' . 
This account of ethical and political relationships rests on an 
illusion. The illusion is that rare, great individuals are fully self-
sufficient, that they erupt into the world with all their creative 
forces fully developed from within. Human beings, even very 
superior human beings, come into possession of their powers 
only through a long period of growth from childhood, in 
relationships of dependence on others; their self-sufficiency and 
achievement is sustained only in relation to others; and if they 
live long enough they too will need the support of others in old 
age. Nietzsche's critique of traditional morality cuts deep, and 
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his ethical thought is of continuing significance. However, his 
vision of individuals of great health, of argonauts who strike out 
for an undiscovered country, is flawed in its origins. What is 
missing is attention to the basis of an ethical life in the carer-
child relationship and acknowledgement of dependence, and 
inter-dependence, in the other primary forms of human 
association. 
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